Built from natural fabrics. Made to last.

Tax policy doesn’t just collect revenue — it quietly shapes what gets made, and by whom.

India’s apparel GST follows a seemingly straightforward rule: garments priced at 2,500 or below attract 5% GST; anything above that is taxed at 18%. The intent is reasonable — keep everyday clothing affordable. But the outcome is something rather different. The structure effectively rewards cheap, disposable clothing, makes it harder for responsible small-scale brands to exist, and — as we’ll show — was made significantly worse by the very reform that was supposed to fix it.

There are three distinct injuries here. The first is environmental. The second falls on small brands who never had a choice about where they’d land on this cliff. The third is a question about who this system ultimately serves — and who shaped it.

A simple analogy: the crisp vendor problem

Before we get into apparel, consider two vendors selling packets of crisps.

Vendor A uses cheap palm oil — lower input cost, better margins, and a retail price of 20. Vendor B uses ghee or cold-pressed olive oil — significantly more expensive inputs, and a retail price of 30, not because they want to appear premium, but because that is what the oil costs.

Now imagine the government decides that all snacks priced below 25 attract 5% GST, and anything above that attracts 18%. Vendor A pays 1 in tax. Vendor B pays 5.40.

The customer, seeing 20 versus 30 on the shelf, reaches for Vendor A. What they don’t see: cheap doesn’t mean costless. The difference shows up later as cardiovascular disease, metabolic harm, and public health expenditure. Vendor A kept the price low by pushing those costs onto someone else. The tax system rewarded them for it.

This is precisely what India’s apparel GST does to clothing. The analogy is not decorative — it is structurally identical.

The hidden bill in every cheap garment

Every piece of clothing carries two kinds of costs. The first is what the brand and the buyer pay directly — fabric, labour, stitching, finishing. The second is what neither of them pays, but what ends up being paid anyway — just later, and by someone else.

Economists call these externalised costs. In apparel, they show up as rivers polluted by synthetic dyes, landfills filling with clothes worn three times, microplastics shed into water systems by polyester fabrics during every wash cycle, and the public money spent managing all of it.

Fast fashion keeps its prices low largely by not paying these costs upfront. The bill doesn’t disappear — it gets deferred onto the environment, municipalities, and future generations.

Responsible clothing does the opposite. It internalises more of that cost — in better fabrics, smaller batches, cleaner processing, stronger construction. Which is precisely why it costs more.

What the GST cliff does

The jump from 5% to 18% GST is large enough to reshape product and business decisions entirely — but its most damaging feature isn’t the rate itself. It’s the cliff.

A graduated tax that rises slowly with price would be one thing. What India’s apparel GST creates instead is a sudden 13-percentage-point step at a single price point. Cross 2,500 by even one rupee, and the entire transaction is reclassified.

The practical consequence is a dead zone — a band of prices where neither the brand nor the customer wins, and only the government does.

Consider three versions of the same jacket:

Jacket A — priced at 2,500 (5% GST)

  • GST collected: ~119
  • Revenue to brand: ~2,381

Jacket B — priced at 3,000 (18% GST)

  • GST collected: ~458
  • Revenue to brand: ~2,542

Jacket C — priced at 3,200 (18% GST)

  • GST collected: ~489
  • Revenue to brand: ~2,711

The customer buying Jacket B pays 500 more than for Jacket A. Of that 500, the brand receives 161. The government collects 339.

The customer buying Jacket C pays 700 more than for Jacket A. The brand receives 330 more. The government collects 370 more.

In other words: for every additional rupee a customer spends in the 2,500–3,200 band, the government takes roughly 50–55 paise and the brand keeps the rest. The sticker price climbs steeply. The brand’s actual revenue barely moves. And the customer gets nothing for that extra spend except a higher number on the tag.

This dead zone is not a marginal inconvenience. It is a structural trap. The cliff doesn’t just tax the product. It taxes the perception of value.

The GST cliff is at 2,500. Cross it and your tax rate jumps from 5% to 18%. A synthetic jacket at 2,400 doesn’t cross it. A hemp-cotton jacket at 3,800 can’t avoid it. The synthetic jacket’s real costs — microplastics in rivers, landfill overflow, disposable consumption — don’t appear on the price tag. They’re paid later, by the environment and the public.

And the government, in creating this cliff, has done something that goes beyond merely collecting more tax. It has built a pricing moat around fast fashion that no small responsible brand can breach — not through better design, tighter margins, or harder work. The structure simply doesn’t allow it.

The small brand problem: a cliff you were always going to fall off

For large fast-fashion brands, the 2,500 threshold is a design constraint — uncomfortable, but manageable. They have the volume to negotiate fabric costs down, spread overheads across thousands of units, and cross-subsidise across a wide product range. Staying under 2,500 with workable margins is difficult but achievable.

For a small independent brand making garments in natural fabrics, the 2,500 threshold isn’t a constraint. It’s a different country entirely.

Consider what it actually costs to produce a hemp-cotton jacket at small scale. Hemp-cotton fabric in a predominantly hemp blend costs anywhere between 800 and 1,200 per metre. A jacket requires at least two to two-and-a-half metres. That’s 1,600 to 3,000 in fabric alone — before a single stitch has been sewn.

Add cut and make charges at a small job-work unit, hardware (zips, buttons, snaps), washing and finishing, labelling and packaging, and a small brand is already looking at substantial direct production costs at a batch of 100 units — with no negotiating power on any of these inputs.

Then come the overheads that don’t appear in any production invoice but are very real: staff costs, workspace rent, design and sampling, photography, platform and payment gateway fees, return logistics, and unsold inventory that doesn’t move. At small volumes, these costs per unit are significant. There is no spreading them thin.

And then comes the ecommerce reality: discounts, platform cuts, customer acquisition costs, and the invisible burden of competing on a screen against brands whose jackets are listed at 1,499.

A small brand making a hemp-cotton jacket honestly — paying its workers fairly, using quality materials, operating with any semblance of financial sustainability — is not going to price that jacket anywhere close to 3,500. It cannot. The fully-loaded price, reflecting what it actually costs to run a small apparel business responsibly, pushes considerably beyond that. Which means it sits deep inside 18% GST territory before the brand has made a single discretionary decision.

This is the fundamental inequity the current structure creates. Large brands can engineer their way under the cliff. Small brands are structurally priced above it. The tax bracket that was meant to keep clothing affordable ends up functioning as a competitive moat for the brands least in need of one.

For a detailed breakdown of what goes into the cost of a hemp garment at every stage — from fibre to finished jacket — read: Why Do Hemp Clothes Cost More

Who this concentrates the market toward

If the above plays out at scale across the industry — and it does — the long-run consequence is market consolidation. Small brands that cannot absorb the structural disadvantage either exit, shrink, or pivot downmarket, abandoning the quality positioning that made them worth supporting in the first place.

The brands that survive and scale are those with the volume to play the cliff game. The brands that struggle are precisely those doing the most to internalise cost, use responsible materials, and manufacture at human scale.

Over time, the tax structure doesn’t just disadvantage small brands in individual transactions. It slowly removes them from the market. What remains is a landscape increasingly dominated by large operators producing at volume, in synthetic fabrics, at prices the cliff was designed to protect.

The double whammy

India’s GST 2.0, announced in September 2025, was presented as a rationalisation — a simplification of a complex, distortion-prone tax structure. In many respects it was. But for the apparel industry, the reform did something worth examining closely.

It made two significant changes at once.

The first: synthetic fibres like polyester — the raw material of fast fashion — had their GST slashed from 18% to 5%. Synthetic yarns came down from 12% to 5%. The stated rationale was correcting an inverted duty structure that had made synthetic textile manufacturing uncompetitive. Legitimate enough as an objective.

The second: garments priced above 2,500 had their GST raised from 12% to 18%. The stated rationale was revenue rationalisation and simplification of slabs.

Consider what these two changes, taken together, actually do.

Brands manufacturing in synthetic fabrics — polyester, nylon, man-made fibres — saw their input costs fall significantly. Their finished products, almost universally priced under 2,500, continue to attract 5% GST at the point of sale. They were handed a cost reduction upstream and faced no additional burden downstream.

Brands manufacturing in natural fabrics — hemp, cotton canvas, linen — saw no equivalent input cost relief. Their finished products, structurally priced above 2,500 for reasons entirely outside their control, now face 18% GST instead of 12%. They received nothing upstream and were handed a heavier burden downstream.

The reform did not merely maintain the existing disadvantage for responsible small brands. It widened it — in both directions simultaneously.

There is one more detail worth noting. India’s largest domestic producer of polyester is Reliance Industries, the world’s largest polyester manufacturer. The production of viscose fibre is almost entirely controlled by Grasim Industries, part of the Aditya Birla group. Both are among India’s most powerful corporate conglomerates. Both have significant and growing interests in fast fashion retail — Reliance through Trends, Yousta, and its partnership with Shein; Tata through Zudio, which prices almost everything under 1,000.

These are the companies whose upstream raw material costs fell under GST 2.0. These are the retail formats whose price points sit comfortably below the cliff. These are the businesses for whom the reform — whether by design or by coincidence — delivered a double benefit: cheaper inputs and an undisturbed competitive position at the consumer end.

We are not in a position to say who shaped this policy, or what conversations informed it. Policy is complex, and the GST Council involves multiple stakeholders, state governments, and competing interests. Reforms rarely emerge from a single agenda.

But we can say this: if you were designing a tax structure to entrench large synthetic fast fashion operators and make life harder for small brands making garments in natural fabrics, it would look a great deal like what GST 2.0 delivered.

That pattern is worth questioning. Publicly. By someone.

Why this matters in India specifically

India has both the problem and the potential. The country generates enormous volumes of textile waste with limited formal recycling infrastructure, already-stressed water systems, and low-capacity municipal waste handling. At the same time, India has genuine strength in natural fibres, skilled artisanal manufacturing, and a tradition of garments made to be repaired rather than replaced.

The current GST structure nudges the industry away from exactly these strengths — toward volume over value, disposability over durability, and large operators over small ones.

This isn’t an argument against affordability

To be clear: the problem isn’t that affordable clothing exists. The problem is a system that treats all low-priced clothing as equivalent, without asking how that low price was achieved — or what it cost someone else.

Affordability built on externalised costs and structural advantages handed to large operators isn’t really affordability. It’s a deferred payment, and someone always pays eventually.

A more considered approach might include smoother GST gradients without sharp cliff-edges, incentives for durable and repairable products, tax structures that price environmental harm rather than honest manufacturing, and recognition that small-batch natural-fabric clothing is not a luxury category — it is a structurally expensive one, for reasons entirely outside the brand’s control.

The principle is simple: don’t penalise brands for paying the real cost upfront.

What we believe

At The Rugged Soul, we make clothing from natural fabrics in small batches. That means absorbing costs that others externalise, and pricing at levels that reflect what responsible manufacturing actually requires — not what the market finds easiest to swallow.

We are not arguing for higher prices to be celebrated. We are arguing that policy should not make honest pricing harder than it already is.

When the tax system treats durable clothing as a luxury and disposable clothing as a necessity — and then quietly rewards the manufacturers of disposable clothing with cheaper inputs — it sends a clear signal to every brand in the market.

We’d like to see that signal change. For our sake, and for every small independent brand in this country trying to build something worth wearing.

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